The Eurozone crisis and European integration: 'new intergovernmentalism' as a valid theory by Lequesne, Christian
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
3 The Eurozone crisis and 
European integration
‘New intergovernmentalism’ as a valid 
theory1
Christian Lequesne
Introduction
As a polity, the European Union (EU) grew up since its creation in 1952 through 
a permanent interaction between two institutional methods: a Supranational 
Method, also called the Community Method, and an interstates method, also 
called the Intergovernmental Method, close from the one characterising diplo-
macy in the Westphalian international system.
 European integration theories have devoted thousands of pages since the 
1950s to assess which of the two methods has been dominant in the development 
of the EU polity. A lot of contributions have been written opposing mainly the 
neofunctionalist argument, insisting on the dominance of the Supranational 
Method, to the statist argument, focusing on the primacy of the Intergovernmen-
tal Method (Saurugger 2013; Rosamond 2000). Each of the two ‘theoretical fam-
ilies’ has never been a monolith and has provided its own nuances, according to 
the authors and to the phenomena they choose to focus on.
	 In	the	1990s,	EU	scholars	became	less	satisfied	with	the	opposition	of	neofunc-
tionalism to intergovernmentalism, and developed alternative theories. New 
approaches, like the multi- governance theory (Hooghe and Marks 2001) or neo- 
institutionalism (Bulmer 2009), introduced more eclecticism and, by the way, gave 
often more importance to the empirical dimension of the analysis (Saurugger 2013).
	 The	economic	and	financial	crisis	of	the	EU,	whose	maximum	intensity	was	
reached between 2008 and 2012, reactivated the debates about the respective 
virtues of theories to understand the EU and the Eurozone (the 19 member states 
of EU using the currency Euro) as polities (Puetter 2006). It moves the EU again 
from	the	study	of	the	policy-	making,	where	it	has	been	very	much	confined	since	
the 1990s, to the study of the polity- making, where it was located between the 
1950s and the 1980s.
 The main objective of this chapter is to show, in accordance with the edited 
volume’s	conceptual	framework,	how	the	economic	and	financial	crisis	has	pro-
duced institutional change in the EU and how this change had impacted the 
theoretical debate. It is structured in three sections.
 In section 1, I will map the main features of supranationalism and intergov-
ernmentalism as institutional methods (and not theories) to demonstrate that, in 
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the	 long	 term,	 the	 EU	 polity	 can	 be	 explained	 as	 a	 recurrent	 balancing	 act	
between the two methods.
	 In	section	2,	I	will	show	how	the	economic	and	financial	crisis	between	2008	
and 2012 has produced change in the power of the EU member states, reinforc-
ing	the	power	of	some	and	decreasing	the	power	of	others.	The	fluctuated	power	
of the member states is one dimension of what Sabine Saurugger and Fabien 
Terpan name institutional density, conceived as ‘a dynamic concept, implying 
fluidity	and	movement’.
	 In	section	3,	I	will	show	how	the	economic	and	financial	crisis	forces	the	EU	
scholars to reassess their theoretical approaches. The emergence of de novo insti-
tutions created by the member states to respond and manage the crisis makes the 
argument of a new intergovernmentalist theory valid. In this case, the substan-
tive intergovernmentalism is not used to describe an institutional method, but is 
a	theoretical	account	to	explain	the	EU	institutional	change.
Supranational and intergovernmental methods: a balancing 
act in the long term
Analyses of the EU as institutional methods (not theories) take rarely into con-
sideration	the	long	period	that	consists	in	more	than	60	years	of	historical	experi-
ence. By method, I mean a process using a particular manner of building 
institutions. Even the so- called historical institutionalists do not consider much 
long- term history, when historians of European integration remain often too 
descriptive and show little interest for conceptualisation. The French political 
scientist Jean- Louis Quermonne (a lawyer by education) is one of the few insti-
tutionalists who have taken into account the long period (what he names le temps 
long in French) to understand the EU institutional methods (Quermonne 2008; 
see also Goetz and Meyer- Sahling 2009). My argument in this section is, when 
we precisely consider the long period, the development of the EU (or of the 
European	 Community	 before	 1993)	 does	 not	 fit	 exclusively	 with	 the	 supra-
national method OR the intergovernmental method, but is a balancing act 
between both.
The Supranational Method
The Supranational Method, also known in the EU practitioners’ jargon as the 
Community Method	 (Dehousse	 2011),	 bears	 on	 six	 institutional	 characteristics	
and practices.
	 The	EU	polity	has	specific	supranational	institutions	able	to	assume	a	certain	
autonomy vis- à-vis the member states that have created them in signing inter-
state treaties. The ‘supranational’ institutions can be run by politicians (like the 
Commission	 and	 the	 European	 Parliament),	 and	 by	 experts	 (like	 the	 Court	 of	
Justice and the European Central Bank). One important tenet of the Supra-
national Method is the right of initiative devoted to the Commission in the EU 
policy	 cycle.	 Except	 on	 CFSP	 issues,	 the	 Commission	 has	 the	 monopoly	 of	
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drafting all policy proposals that will be further discussed and adopted by the 
member states and the European Parliament (Kassim 2013).
 In the Supranational Method, the EU polity requires its own parliament sepa-
rated from the parliaments of the constituent member states. The Supranational 
Method favours the development of a European Parliament – directly elected by 
the	citizens	of	 the	member	states	–	 that	exercises	 its	proper	 legislative	compe-
tences. Between 2009 and 2014, 89 per cent of the EU public policies have been 
adopted through a so- called co- decision procedure between the European Parlia-
ment and the member states (Pittela et al. 2014). Co- decision has become the 
norm of the ordinary legislative procedure in the EU (Ringe 2010).
 The Supranational Method does not deny the role of states’ representatives 
(ministers	and	officials)	inside	EU	institutions:	the	European	Council	(heads	of	
state and government), the Council of ministers (ministers) and the Committee 
of the Permanent Representatives (ambassadors to the EU). However, the Supra-
national Method tries to bypass the principle of national sovereignty within these 
institutions in organising decisions through majority and not unanimity rule. 
With the Supranational Method, the language of negotiations between the 
member states is the language of the majority. Even if the search for consensus 
has not disappeared in the practice of the Council of ministers, the majority rule 
constitutes the main incentive to reach consensus (Naurin and Wallace 2008).
 The Supranational Method assumes that the EU – as one level of a multilevel 
polity – detains its own budget. If the EU budget represents only 1 per cent of 
the	member	states’	GDP	(142	billion	euros	in	2014),	it	is	not	exclusively	funded	
by the member states’ contributions but by a series of own resources: customs 
duties	 on	 imports,	 a	 levy	 on	 the	Value	Added	 Tax.	As	 in	 a	 federal	 state,	 the	
treaties	(equivalent	to	a	constitution)	also	attribute	exclusive	policy	competences	
to	the	central	level.	These	exclusive	competences	devoted	to	the	EU	concern	the	
customs union, the establishing of competition rules, the monetary policy, the 
conservation of marine biological resources, the common commercial policy and 
the conclusion of certain international agreements. In these policy areas, the 
member	states	have	renounced	to	exercise	their	own	policy	competences	to	the	
sole	benefit	of	the	EU	institutions.
 With the Supranational Method, the member states agree that the polity pro-
duces	a	specific	law	–	the	EU	law	–	accepted	as	superior	to	the	national	laws	by	
the member states and whose compliance is compulsory. A European Court of 
Justice composed of European judges, like a constitutional or a supreme court in 
a	federal	state,	 is	 in	charge	of	arbitrating	conflicts	of	competences	between	the	
EU law and the national laws (Meeusen 2013). It is also the European Court of 
Justice that can impose to the member states the implementation of the EU law. 
Since the Treaty of Maastricht (1993), the European Court of Justice can impose 
fines	 to	 the	 incumbent	 states	 that	 do	 not	 comply	with	 the	 EU	 law.	 The	main	
result of this judicialisation is an EU law much closer in its effects from domestic 
laws than from international public law (Foster 2014).
 Finally, the Supranational Method anticipates the possibility for the polity to 
add	 or	 revise	 policies	 from	 the	 existing	 ones.	 Several	 procedures	 exist.	 One	
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applies just to the internal policies of the EU and consists in revising the compe-
tences	 without	 convening	 a	 specific	 conference	 of	 the	member	 states.	 On	 the	
basis of proposals made by the Commission, the European Parliament and the 
European	Council	 can	agree	upon	policy	changes.	A	unanimous	 ratification	of	
the	member	states	is	in	certain	cases	required	and	the	treaties	call	it	a	‘simplified	
revision’. The other procedure consists in reforming the treaties after convening 
a Convention and an Intergovernmental Conference of member states. It is a 
heavier	and	 longer	procedure	 requiring	at	 the	end	 the	 ratification	of	 the	policy	
changes by all the member states, according to their respective constitutional 
practices.
The Intergovernmental Method
Differently from the Supranational Method, the Intergovernmental Method does 
not rest upon the principle of autonomy of the EU vis- à-vis the constituent 
member	states	(Hoffmann	1966).	Close	from	what	exists	in	most	of	international	
governmental organisations, the Intergovernmental Method is characterised by 
five	components.
	 The	EU	polity	 is	 reflecting	what	 the	member	 states	are	bargaining,	because	
the EU institutions are agents at the service of member states considered as prin-
cipals (Pollack 2002). The member states have a right of policy initiative at the 
EU	level.	 In	 the	field	of	CFSP	for	 instance,	 the	member	states	and	not	 the	EU	
Commission have the right of initiative.
 In the Intergovernmental Method, the legislative power is concentrated in the 
hands of the institutions composed of member states – the European Council and 
the EU Council of ministers (Hayes Renshaw and Wallace 2006). Inside those 
institutions, the power is dominated by the ‘big’ member states. The policy- 
making also escapes for a large part any parliamentary power at the EU level.
 In the Intergovernmental Method, the decisions agreed by the member states 
respect the principle of national sovereignty in using unanimity rather than 
majority voting. Each member state keeps a veto power, as it is the case in policy 
domains	like	CFSP,	citizenship,	enlargement	policy,	tax	policy.	It	does	not	mean	
that there is no deliberative dynamic. As for the supranational institutions, nego-
tiating	and	bargaining	are	normal	modes	of	political	exchange	inside	 the	 inter-
governmental institutions (Naurin and Wallace, 2008).
 In the Intergovernmental Method, there is no compulsory EU law having a 
direct effect on the national laws. The European Court of Justice has no power to 
exercise	a	 judiciary	control,	as	 it	 is	 the	case	for	CFSP	and	CSDP	(Garbagnati-	
Kebel 2006).
 Finally, the Intergovernmental Method does not necessarily require a reform 
of	the	EU	treaties	to	add	new	policy	competences	to	the	existing	ones.	There	is	a	
possibility to develop new policies on an ad hoc basis through interstate treaties, 
as the Prüm Convention on the stepping up of cross- border cooperation, signed 
in	 May	 2005	 between	 Austria,	 Belgium,	 France,	 Germany,	 Luxemburg,	 the	
Netherlands and Spain and the Treaty on Stability, Governance and Coordination 
693 03 Crisis 03.indd   44 26/1/16   14:59:53
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
Eurozone crisis and European integration  45
signed	in	March	2012	by	all	member	states	except	the	Czech	Republic	and	the	
United Kingdom.2 In these cases, the policy changes affecting the polity are 
mainly referring to international public law.
The balancing act
In the long period, the development of the EU polity is a recurrent balancing act 
between the Supranational Method and the Intergovernmental Method. What 
scholars name European integration is the outcome of permanent interactions 
between both methods. The resulting polity is a hybrid with no equivalent among 
domestic	and	international	institutions.	It	explains	why	scholars	often	use	peri-
phrases to qualify this polity, as William Wallace when he wrote that the EU 
was ‘more than an international regime and less than a federation’ (Wallace 
1983). Being a hybrid polity does not mean that this polity cannot be compared 
to	 other	 existing	 models.	 There	 is	 a	 huge	 difference	 between	 underlying	 this	
hybridisation and stressing the so- called sui generis nature of the EU. The latter 
does not make sense, as all polities can be regarded as sui generis.
 To demonstrate empirically that the EU polity is a balancing act between the 
Supranational Method and the Intergovernmental Method, it is useful to look at 
the policy level. The making of policies in (and not by) the EU since 1952 can 
all be located in a continuum going from the Supranational Method to the Inter-
governmental Method, with regular crossings and overlaps. There is a pole of 
pure intergovernmentalism represented by the CFSP and the CSDP at one tip of 
the	continuum	and	a	pole	of	pure	supranationalism	represented	by	the	exclusive	
competences of the EU at the other tip.3
 All the other policy issues are located in between, at a distance that is more or 
less	far	from	the	two	poles.	It	is	confirmed	by	the	vast	number	of	‘share	compe-
tences’ that the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union mentions in its 
article 4. A ‘share competence’ is the legal name to describe policy overlaps 
between the Supranational Method and the Intergovernmental Method.
 Four observations can be raised about the effects of the two institutional 
methods on the EU polity, when we consider long- term period.
 First, the EU member states have been more prepared to delegate to the supra-
national institutions (the centre) the management of their economic interdepend-
ence than the management of their security. Interestingly, a comparison with 
most	 of	 the	 federal	 states	 existing	 in	 the	 world	 shows	 an	 opposite	 trend:	 the	
security and defence issues are often central competences when economics is 
more	under	 the	competences	of	 the	 federated	 states	 (Burgess	2006).	The	diffi-
culty	to	delegate	the	security	issues	is	more	difficult	for	military	issues,	a	signi-
ficant	example	of	failure	being	the	project	of	the	European	Defence	Community	
in 1954. It is not at all the same trend for police and immigration issues. Since 
the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997), the member states have accepted to move 
immigration, police and control of borders issues, which were ruled by the Inter-
governmental Method (the Third Pillar of the Maastricht Treaty) to the supra-
national pole (Bremberg 2015).
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 Second, if the Supranational Method applies more to the management of eco-
nomic	issues	than	security	issues,	we	can	observe	counter-	examples	going	in	the	
direction	 of	 the	 Intergovernmental	Method,	 as	 tax	 harmonisation	 for	 example,	
ruled by unanimity in the Council of ministers. None of the institutional reforms 
that took place since the Single European Act, in 1986, was able to modify this 
situation.
	 Third,	 the	 examples	 of	 re-	nationalisation	 of	 EU	 policies	 have	 been	 rare	
despite political debates in favour of such an evolution in some member states, 
like the United Kingdom or the Netherlands. Since the Single European Act 
(1986),	we	can	find	obvious	examples	of	policies	that	moved	from	the	Intergov-
ernmental Method to the Supranational Method, as the policy on justice and 
home affairs or some aspects of economic policy (Schimmelfennig 2015a: 3). 
There	are	less	obvious	examples	of	the	opposite	movement,	except	some	issues	
of	the	Common	Agricultural	Policy,	which	moved	from	exclusive	competences	
to shared competences under the Treaty of Lisbon (Skogstad and Verdun 2010).
	 Finally,	there	is	a	strong	influence	of	the	28	domestic	politics	of	the	member	
states on the pendulum between the Supranational Method and the Intergovern-
mental Method. For this reason, it is senseless to study EU integration without 
investing in parallel the domestic politics and the polities of the member states 
(Bulmer and Lequesne 2013).
 If the EU polity can be considered empirically as a balancing act between the 
two methods, why do theories lose then so much time to demonstrate theoretic-
ally the superiority of neofunctionalism on intergovernmentalism or vice- versa? 
The answer to this question is because theories often focus on periods and policy 
domains	where	one	method	has	been	more	pregnant	that	the	other	to	explain	the	
development of the EU polity. This is precisely why theories, to move forward, 
have to avoid catching entirely the Supranational Method or the Intergovernmen-
tal	Method	 to	explain	 the	development	of	 the	EU	polity,	but	have	 to	find	new	
tools	to	explain	the	interactions	between	both,	as	I	will	demonstrate	in	section	3.
The impact of economic crisis on member states’ power
In their introduction to this book, Saurugger and Terpan formulate the hypo-
thesis that ‘the higher the relative power of actors, the higher the probability that 
these	actors	influence	institutional	change’	in	regional	integration.	I	will	consider	
this hypothesis in insisting on the causal impact of ‘domestic politics’ (Bulmer 
2015).	 In	 the	 case	 of	 the	 economic	 and	 financial	 crisis	 of	 2008,	 institutional	
change is not so much the result of how regional institutions constraint member 
states,	but	of	how	member	states	were	able	to	influence	the	crisis	domestically.	
To measure the impact of the crisis on what Saurugger and Terpan name ‘insti-
tutional density’, we must absolutely consider the capacity of each member 
states	to	cope	efficiently	or	not	with	the	crisis	and	to	influence	or	not	policy	deci-
sions. I am deliberately choosing the case of four member states usually classi-
fied	 in	 the	 category	 of	 the	 ‘big’	 –	 Germany,	 France,	 Poland	 and	 Spain	 –	 to	
demonstrate this causality.
693 03 Crisis 03.indd   46 26/1/16   14:59:53
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
Eurozone crisis and European integration  47
Germany: the empowerment of the ‘virtuous’ economy
Since	the	1990	reunification,	Germany	is	the	most	populated	member	state	of	the	
EU (82 million inhabitants) and the fourth economy in the world. The costs of 
the	1990	reunification	had	negative	effects	on	the	macro-	economic	situation	of	
Germany, which was considered at the end of the 1990s as the ‘thick economy 
of Europe’. After ten years of salary restriction and welfare austerity, the country 
recovered his position in 2010, just after the start of the economic crisis. Simon 
Bulmer has showed how ‘Germany has played a prominent role in advocating 
solutions	to	the	Eurozone	crisis’	(Bulmer	2014:	1253).	Chancellor	Merkel’s	first	
diagnostic in 2009 was that Greece had an internal problem and had to follow 
the EU rules in order to resolve it (Jones 2014). Only in spring 2010 was the 
recognition by Berlin that the crisis needs a European emergency arrangement, 
because of the risk of contamination. 
As the scale of the Eurozone crisis became apparent, with rescues afforded 
to, successively Ireland (autumn 2010), Portugal (spring 2011), Greece 
again (summer 2011), with the risks of spill- over to Spain and Italy, plus the 
bailout of Cyprus in 2013, German policy was forced to evolve. 
(Bulmer 2014: 1253)
 It is during this long second phase that the CDU/CSU – FDP government 
argues	for	fiscal	discipline	and	strict	conditionality	to	be	imposed	on	the	recip-
ients of the rescue funds. This policy, as we will see in section 3, produces 
results in inspiring the creation of new institutions at the EU level. France in 
particular found compromises with Germany but without being able to rebal-
ance	the	general	philosophy	of	fiscal	discipline	and	conditionality	towards	less	
austerity.	It	was	explicit	when	the	right-	wing	Nicolas	Sarkozy	was	president,	
but	also	when	the	left-	wing	François	Hollande	took	office	after	the	May	2012	
presidential election (Lequesne 2014). If the new socialist President articu-
lated a discourse on the necessity not to forget growth, his government – con-
fronted	 to	 a	 strong	 public	 deficit	 (4.1	 per	 cent	 in	 2010)	 –	 was	 not	 able	 to	
oppose	 in	 EU	 negotiations	 the	 fiscal	 orthodoxy	 established	 in	 Berlin	 and	
shared by a certain number of Northern countries like the Netherlands, 
Denmark and Poland. There is then evidence that Germany – which recovered 
itself from the slow down of its economy – has played, through its policy 
actions, both a dominant and a leadership role in the Eurozone crisis. The eco-
nomic crisis makes Germany the de facto hegemon of Europe not through an 
explicit	political	project	to	dominate	Europe,	but	because	of	its	economic	posi-
tion and the impossibility for the other member states to impose credible and 
convincing alternatives (Paterson 2011; Lequesne 2015). Considering the 
necessity raised by Saurugger and Terpan not to limit the analysis of institu-
tional density to governmental decisions, the German position at the EU level 
was reinforced by the broader concern of German institutions and German 
public about EU representation and legitimacy.
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 At the German domestic level, debates about the Greek crisis involved three 
German institutions which have based their legitimacy on the 1949 Basic Law: 
first,	the	German	parliament	(Bundestag)	and	the	Federal	Court	of	Justice	(Bun-
desverfassungsgericht) which have often convergent strategies; and second, the 
German Bundesbank.
 In 2009, the Federal Court of Justice of Karlsruhe ruled on the constitution-
ality of the Lisbon Treaty, ‘holding again the Treaty was in conformity with 
the Basic Law’ (Bulmer and Paterson 2013: 1399). In the absence of a Euro-
pean demos, the German Federal Court required new legislation to be passed 
to	grant	the	Bundestag	appropriate	powers	before	the	ratification	of	the	Treaty	
of Lisbon (Auel and Höing 2014). Similar parliamentary conditionality has 
arisen from judgements directly inspired by the measures decided at the EU 
level to cope with the Eurozone crisis: one on the European Financial Stability 
Facility (in 2011) and the other on the European Stability Mechanism and the 
Fiscal Compact (September 2012). The European Stability Mechanism, for 
instance, ‘was declared compatible with the German Basic Law, but any 
increase	 in	 its	 resourcing	would	 have	 to	 receive	 the	 explicit	 approval	 of	 the	
Bundestag’ (Bulmer and Paterson 2013: 1399). The German Bundesbank also 
plays a role in the German political debate, as the largest shareholder of the 
European Central Bank and a highly respected institution in the public 
opinion. The new president appointed in February 2011, Jens Weidmann 
(Chancellor Merkel’s former economic adviser), criticised several times 
during the crisis the lack of economic convergence in the Eurozone and the 
necessity	 to	 think	 about	 the	 exit	 of	 default	members,	 looking	 particularly	 at	
Greece. In July 2012, he opposed publicly the ECB Board of Directors’ deci-
sion to buy Spanish and Italian bonds to keep interest rates in these countries 
capped at manageable levels (Linn 2012).
 These institutional positions emphasised some reactions among the German 
public	against	letting	the	German	taxpayer	financing	the	deficits	of	the	so-	called	
‘badly managed’ Southern EU member states. It gave birth in February 2013 to 
a new political party, Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), hunting votes among 
the electorates of the Chancellor’s party CDU and the Liberal party FDP who 
considered	that	the	Eurozone	has	become	a	real	burden	for	the	German	taxpayer.	
AfD got 7 per cent of the votes in the European elections of June 2014 and 
entered four regional parliaments in 2014 and 2015 (Brandenburg, Thüringen, 
Saxe	and	Hamburg).	 It	has	become	a	competitor	for	 the	German	governments,	
both during the CDU/CSU/FDP coalition (2009–2013) and the CDU/CSU/SPD 
‘Great Coalition’ after 2013.
 Both the good state of the German economy and the changing debate about 
Europe in the German public opinion are variables to understand why the 
German	government	was	keeping	firm	on	 its	model	of	fiscal	orthodoxy	 in	EU	
negotiations. More than ever, Germany appeared to itself but also to the partners 
the powerful member state able to give the tone to institutional density in the EU 
(Kundnani 2014; Schimmelfennig 2015b, Lequesne 2015).
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France: not wealthy enough to impose an alternative scenario
France is a country that a long tradition of co- leading the EU with Germany 
(Krotz and Schild 2013), and, in some policy issues like defence, with the UK. 
France, a long time defender of Keynesianism in Europe, was not totally resist-
ant to the neoliberal norms that penetrated Europe after the mid 1980s (Jobert 
1994, Hall 2012). Parts of the bureaucratic and political elites (both right and 
left)	became	convinced	that	fiscal	discipline	is	a	valid	argument	and	that	France	
did	not	do	enough	to	control	its	public	budget	under	deficit	since	1974.	It	does	
not mean that the French elites were suddenly sharing a neoliberal line and that 
the pro- austerity argument was successful to impose a decrease of the French 
public	deficit,	because	of	strong	veto	players	in	the	French	society	(Algan	et al. 
2009).
	 In	 the	 first	 phase	 of	 the	 economic	 crisis	 (2009–2011),	 President	 Nicolas	
Sarkozy assumed the necessity to work in the same direction than the German 
Chancellor	Merkel	upon	the	creation	of	fiscal	rules	to	make	the	Eurozone	more	
sustainable. It immediately created in France an opposition to the ‘Merkozy’ 
tandem, President Sarkozy being accused of following what Merkel wanted and 
renouncing to play the established role of an independent leader in the Gaullist 
tradition (Lequesne 2013). In the perspective of the presidential election of 2012, 
the Socialist candidate François Hollande understood the political importance for 
his campaign to distinguish his economic views from the German economic 
orthodoxy.	His	discursive	claim	 to	give	more	 importance	 to	growth	 in	 the	EU	
was mostly an instrument to differentiate himself from ‘Merkozy’ and to give 
the impression that France was not just following Berlin. After Hollande suc-
ceeded in the May 2012 election, he asked the European Council to adopt in 
June 2012 a ‘European Pact on Growth’ but, for the rest, did not renegotiate the 
Fiscal	 Compact	 signed	 by	 Sarkozy.	 The	 French	 Parliament	 ratified	 the	 Fiscal	
Compact with a large majority in October 2012 (Lequesne 2014). There are at 
least	 two	explanations	 to	 that	decision.	A	first	 explanation	 is	 ideological:	Hol-
lande chose prime ministers (Jean- Marc Ayrault, and then Manuel Valls) and 
ministers	of	finance	 (Pierre	Moscovici,	 and	 then	Michel	Sapin)	who	belong	 to	
the centre- left of the Socialist Party and accept the idea of cuts in the public 
spending.	The	 second	 explanation	has	 to	 do	with	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	
state of the French domestic economy and the ability of the French government 
to	influence	institutional	change	in	the	EU.	Due	to	structural	difficulties	aggra-
vated	by	the	crisis	(a	decrease	of	firms’	competitiveness	and	10	per	cent	unem-
ployment rate), Hollande’s France was not in a position to impose to the EU a 
credible alternative economic model to the German one. This economic vulner-
ability has been correlated to a political one: the raise of the far right party Front 
National that proposed the withdrawal of France from the Eurozone and a return 
to the French Franc. The National Front got the largest number of seats in the 
European elections of June 2014, sending 23 deputies to the European Parlia-
ment. Due to these weaknesses directly linked to the governance of the economic 
crisis at the domestic level, France’s traditional role of co- leading power in the 
693 03 Crisis 03.indd   49 26/1/16   14:59:54
50  C. Lequesne
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
EU	decreased	when	Germany	imposed	itself	as	the	leading	power	that	influence	
the direction of institutional change in Europe (Fabbrini 2013). This equation 
resulting	 from	 the	 economic	 crisis	 also	 explains	why	 France	 decided	 –	 under	
Sarkozy	as	under	Hollande	–	to	adopt	a	higher	profile	compared	to	the	rest	of	the	
EU (UK included) regarding the foreign and military interventions abroad. These 
domains	are	exactly	 the	ones	where	Germany	–	due	 to	 its	history	–	 is	not	pre-
pared to compete with France (Lequesne 2015). This French strategy of assert-
iveness	in	external	foreign	policy	is	a	form	of	compensation	to	the	difficulty	to	
influence	institutional	change	in	the	economic	and	financial	domains.
Poland and Spain: the opposite effects of the crisis on power
Spain and Poland have often been compared as countries of a similar size inside 
the	EU,	having	both	experienced	democratic	 transition	and	a	strong	support	of	
their public opinion towards the EU as a way to modernise both their state and 
society. The differentiated effects of the economic crisis on each country have 
impacted	their	respective	capacity	to	influence	institutional	change.
 The Spanish crisis began in 2008. The main cause of Spain’s crisis was an 
enormous	 housing	 bubble	 and	 the	 accompanying	 artificial	 and	 unsustainably	
high	GDP	growth	rate.	In	2009,	Spain	entered	officially	in	recession.	The	con-
sequences were a strong economic downturn, a severe increase in unemployment 
and bankruptcies of major companies. The Socialist government of José Luis 
Zapatero	 started	 austerity	 measures,	 but	 did	 not	 ask	 for	 EU	 loans	 in	 the	 first	
years of the crisis. It is only in 2012 that the Conservative government of 
Mariano	Rajoy	was	unable	to	bailout	its	financial	sector	and	had	to	apply	for	a	
€100 billion rescue package provided by the European Stability Mechanism 
(ESM). Spain felt suddenly in the category of the ‘left behind’ states of the EU 
(Garcia Cantalapiedra and Pacheco Pardo 2014). The jump of the unemployment 
rate (50.7 per cent for those younger than 25 years old in January 2012) forced 
young	people	–	including	qualified	ones	–	to	migrate	to	other	EU	member	states,	
especially	Germany.	Movements	of	undignified	people	grew	up	in	Madrid	and	in	
the main cities of the country, leading to the creation of a new left- wing party 
Podemos opposed to the strong conditionality imposed by the EU institutions. In 
the EU negotiations, the position of Spain changed from a proactive country sup-
porting all new steps of European integration to one submitted to conditionality 
from the northern countries, and especially from Germany. The economic crisis 
has changed the power of Spain, moving from a member state considered virtu-
ous to a member state under EU monitoring. In October 2012, the so- called 
Troika (European Commission, ECB and IMF ) started negotiations with Spain 
to	establish	an	economic	recovery	programme	in	exchange	 to	additional	finan-
cial loans from the European Stability Mechanism. The effect of the crisis on the 
decrease of the Spanish power in the EU has been direct. Mariano Rajoy’s gov-
ernment implemented the austerity measures but also started in parallel a strategy 
of nation branding, named Marca Espana, to recover a good image abroad, espe-
cially among the EU investors.4 The main objective was that Spain escaped as 
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soon as possible the group of ‘thick economies’ of the Eurozone to recover a 
leverage on the EU institutional change (Garcia Cantalapiedra and Pacheco 
Pardo 2014).
 Contrary to Spain, Poland is one of the EU member states that have been the 
least	impacted	by	the	economic	and	financial	crisis	in	the	period	2008–2012.	The	
reasons are both institutional and economic. The institutional factor is the non- 
participation of Poland to the Eurozone, despite the political commitment of the 
centre- right government of Donald Tusk to adopt the Euro (Pomorska and Van-
hoonacker 2012). Keeping a capacity to play on the devaluation of the zloty was 
an advantage all over the economic crisis, despite the contradiction with the 
political objective to join the Eurozone. The economic factor is the cautiousness 
of	the	Polish	banks	vis-	à-vis	the	purchase	of	toxic	assets	in	the	decade	preceding	
the crisis. Contrary to other countries like Ireland, Greece or Spain, the Polish 
prudential rules were conservative enough to avoid major risks on the foreign 
financial	markets.
 The Polish government led by Prime Minister Tusk adopted during the crisis 
a position on institutional change close from the German one. The Civic Plat-
form (PO), his party, understood that the support to the more powerful member 
state of the EU was a way to reach a main objective: being recognised as a ‘big’ 
member state. In terms of strategy, the discourse of Polish leaders played an 
instrumental role, especially during the Polish Presidency of 2011 where Poland 
suffered	from	being	excluded	from	the	Eurogroup	negotiations	(Lauenroth	and	
von Ondarza 2014). The Polish minister of Foreign Affairs, Radoslaw Sikorski, 
did not hesitate to repeat publicly that in the face of the economic crisis, Poland 
was considering itself as ‘North European’ country, which meant in the camp of 
the ‘responsible’ Germany and other member states as the Netherlands and 
Finland (Jokela 2015). In a discourse in Berlin in November 2011, Sikorski 
asked for a further strengthening of institutional change in the EU, proposing a 
merger of the posts of the Presidents of the European Council and the European 
Commission. He even advocated the direct election of the President by the Euro-
pean demos. Warning that EU was standing at the brink of a disaster, he spoke 
strongly in favour of active power of its Western neighbour: ‘I will probably be 
the	first	Polish	foreign	minister	in	history	to	say	so,	but	here	it	is:	I	fear	German	
power less than I am beginning to fear German inactivity’.5 As Pomorska and 
Vanhoonacker rightly observe: 
The	 speech	 was	 a	 clear	 expression	 of	 the	 Polish	 desire	 to	 be	 part	 of	 the	
European core and also an illustration of how Poland, since its accession in 
2004, has increasingly been turning towards the EU rather than the United 
States, with Germany becoming its major partner. 
(Pomorska and Vanhoonacker 2012: 78) 
For	Poland,	the	rapprochement	with	Germany	during	the	economic	and	financial	
crisis was an instrument to increase its own power in the EU. This strategy has 
borne fruit as Poland started to be considered more not simply as a ‘new’ 
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member state of Central Europe, but as a ‘big’ member state with a political 
ambition regarding institutional change. In the French White book on Defence 
and National Security published in 2013, Poland is mentioned as a worthy 
partner for a future European Defence Policy (Livre blanc sur la défense et la 
sécurité nationale, 2013). Former President Giscard d’Estaing published in 2014 
a book where he suggested a new start for the Eurozone around a limited number 
of 12 states. The only Central and East European State included in Giscard’s list 
was Poland (Giscard d’Estaing 2014: 127). The rapprochement with the ‘earnest’ 
Germany was the political mean that the Polish government used to consolidate 
this	 strategy	 of	 empowerment,	 expecting	 political	 dividends	 at	 the	 EU	 level	
(Kaminska 2014).
 This comparative analysis is important to demonstrate how the member states 
remain main units to be taken into account in the analysis of institutional change 
in	the	EU.	Understanding	the	EU	polity	requires	the	necessity	to	open	the	box	of	
domestic politics and to do in parallel comparative politics (Bulmer and 
Lequesne 2013). More than ever, understanding institutional change in the EU 
requires an analysis of ‘how problems in domestic preference formation have 
become standalone inputs into European integration process’ (Bickerton et al. 
2015). It imposes an interest not only for the negotiations taking place in 
Brussels but also in each member state.
	 The	 economic	 and	 financial	 crisis	 is	 a	 good	 example	 of	 how	 the	 member	
states’	polities	influence	their	respective	capacity	to	impose	institutional	change	
in the EU. Power arises both from a capacity to impose decisions in the inter-
governmental game and to present a ‘respectful image’. Analysing institutional 
density in regional integration as the degree to which regional institutions con-
strain member states in their domestic and international politics is clearly not 
enough. We must also admit that domestic politics constraints institutional 
change.
De novo institutions and the theory of new 
intergovernmentalism
This section is not using the term intergovernmentalism to qualify a method but 
a	theory.	The	economic	and	financial	crisis	has	reactivated	among	EU	scholars	
the	 project	 to	 elaborate	 ‘grand	 theory’	 instead	 of	 concentrating	 exclusively	 on	
the ‘less grandiose issues’ of EU policies or EU governance (Bulmer 2015: 289). 
In this refreshing debate, Bickerton et al. bring a solid theoretical argument 
about	what	they	call	new	intergovernmentalism	defined	as	a	way	to	explain	the	
‘new phase in European integration’ that represents the Post- Maastricht era 
(Bickerton et al. 2015: 3).
 Bickerton et al. formulate	six	hypotheses,	each	of	which	is	related	to	a	par-
ticular aspect of the new intergovernmentalism:
1 Deliberation and consensus have become the guiding norms of day- to-day 
politics;
693 03 Crisis 03.indd   52 26/1/16   14:59:54
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
Eurozone crisis and European integration  53
2 Supranational institutions are not hard wired to seek ever- closer-union;
3 Where delegation occurs, governments and traditional supranational actors 
support the creation and empowerment of de novo institutions;
4 Problems in domestic preference formation have become standalone inputs 
into European integration process;
5 The differences between high and low politics have become blurred;
6 The EU is in a state of disequilibrium.
Not	 all	 six	 hypotheses	 have	 the	 same	 explanatory	 value,	 as	 further	 empirical	
studies shall demonstrate. Some critics of new intergovernmentalism have 
emerged in the literature, insisting that the theory is not very new compared to 
what Stanley Hoffmann and Andrew Moravcsik have analysed in the past under 
the label of intergovernmentalism or liberal intergovernmentalism (Schim-
melfennig 2015a). I do not share this critic for one main reason: Hoffmann and 
Moravcsik’s	theories	were	mainly	attempts	to	refute	the	influence	of	the	Supra-
national Method and, then, the validity of neofunctionalism as a theory. With 
new institutionalism, we are not anymore in this binary opposition, as the theory 
is reconciling the power of the member states (linked to domestic politics argu-
ment)	without	denying	the	influence	of	the	supranational	method.	It	is	an	inter-
esting attempt to theorise the balancing act between the Supranational Method 
and the Intergovernmental Method.
 Schimmelfennig is right when he says that it is useful to take into account 
the ‘policy characteristics’ to theorise the balancing act (Schimmelfennig 
2015b, 2). Let’s take the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) as an 
example.	EMU	is	typically	a	policy	resulting	from	the	balancing	act	between	
the Supranational Method and the Intergovernmental Method. According to 
the Treaties, the monetary policy is ‘supranationalised’ with an independent 
central bank – the European Central Bank (ECB) – in charge of controlling 
inflation	 in	 the	 member	 states’	 economies.	 The	 main	 rationale	 behind	 this	
policy choice, responding to a strong German demand in the 1990s, was to 
disconnect	the	control	of	inflation	from	electoral	politics	(Fabbrini	2013).	On	
the other hand, the macro- economic policies (the ‘E’ component of EMU) 
have remained a coordination between the member states using the Intergov-
ernmental	Method.	Regarding	EMU,	 the	Treaty	of	Lisbon	has	confirmed	 the	
intergovernmental nature of the EU economic policy, in deciding, as Sergio 
Fabbrini writes, that these policies should be pursued through soft law, not 
hard law’ (Fabbrini 2013: 1008).
 The crisis of 2008–2012 has re- launched, among the EU leaders, a political 
debate about the coherence between a supranational monetary policy and inter-
governmental macro- economic policies. It is here that new intergovernmental-
ism appears very relevant as a theory. The institutional change to move towards 
more macro- economic coherence has consisted for the member states in creating 
de novo	 intergovernmental	bodies,	but	with	clear	links	with	the	existing	supra-
national institutions (Bickerton et al. 2015: 11). Three de novo institutions have 
been created by the EU states to respond to the crisis, using intergovernmental 
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agreements	rather	than	a	formal	reform	of	the	existing	EU	Treaties:	the	European	
Financial Stability Facility (EFSF ) in 2010 to assist the member states that were 
unable	to	finance	their	public	debt;	the	European	Stability	Mechanism	(ESM),	a	
permanent	 structure	 that	 replaced	 the	 EFSF	 in	 2012;	 and	 finally	 the	 Fiscal	
Compact (formally the Treaty on Stability, coordination and governance in the 
European	Union)	signed	by	25	member	states	in	2012	to	impose	fiscal	discipline	
to the national budgets (Verdun 2015).
	 New	 intergovernmentalism	 helps	 to	 explain	 the	 ‘ambivalent	 relationship	
between de novo	institutions’	and	existing	supranational	institutions	provided	by	
the EU Treaties (Bickerton et al. 2011: 11), reinforcing the logic of crossing, 
overlaps and hybridisation between the Intergovernmental Method and the 
Supranational	Method.	Let’s	take	the	example	of	the	Fiscal Compact to under-
stand this ambivalence. It is formally an intergovernmental treaty between 25 
member states to make sure that the national budgets of the Eurozone members 
remain	 in	balance	or	 in	surplus,	but	not	 in	deficit	 (the	so-	called	Golden	Rule).	
The Golden Rule, resulting from a purely intergovernmental treaty, shall 
however work in accordance with join principles proposed by a supranational 
institution, the EU Commission. In the same vein, according to the Fiscal 
Compact, it is another supranational institution – the European Court of Justice 
–	 that	can	decide	financial	 sanctions	against	member	states	 that	do	not	 respect	
the Golden Rule (Treaty on Stability, Governance and Coordination 2012). By 
the way, the Fiscal Compact	creates	for	the	Court	of	Justice	itself	difficulties	in	
the interpretation of EU law. In their Pringle case of 2012, the European judges 
stated that ‘the general principle of effective judicial protection does not pre-
clude the conclusion . . . of an agreement such as the Treaty establishing the 
European stability mechanism’ between a limited number of EU member states 
whose currency is the Euro.6
 The positions of the Heads of State and Government, when they addressed 
the crisis also support the relevance of new intergovernmentalism as a theory. 
German Chancellor Merkel, for instance, made her institutional choice clear 
in the discourse she pronounced in November 2012 at the College of Europe 
in Bruges. She stated that time has not to be wasted anymore in debates about 
the	benefits	of	the	supranational	or	intergovernmental	methods	of	integration.	
For her, the EU can establish intergovernmental frames that give responsibil-
ities	 to	 the	 existing	 EU	 supranational	 institutions.	 This	 is	 what	 Chancellor	
Merkel calls the Union Method – in German die Unionsmethode.7 President 
Sarkozy goes in the same direction when he said, in a speech in Toulon on 2 
December 2011, that ‘the reform of Europe is not a march towards supra- 
nationality . . . The integration of Europe will go the intergovernmental way 
because Europe needs to make strategic political choices’ (quoted in Fabbrini 
2013: 1012). The positions of major EU leaders are useful to investigate more 
the causality of hybridisation between the Supranational Method and the 
Intergovernmental Method catched by new intergovernmentalism. Two causal 
factors	 can	 at	 least	 be	 identified.	 The	 first	 has	 to	 do	 with	 controversial	
domestic politics on the management of the Eurocrisis, which makes the 
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empowerment	of	supranational	 institutions	more	difficult	 to	present	 in	 terms	
of	 public	 justification	 and	 legitimacy.	 This	 is	what	we	 saw	 in	 Section	 2,	 in	
particular about Germany. The second causal factor is the increased require-
ment, with the economic crisis, of differentiation in negotiation and imple-
mentation (Leuffen et al.	 2012).	 Concerning	 negotiation	 first,	 only	 19	 EU	
member states on 28 are participating to the Eurozone and some of them (like 
the United Kingdom, Denmark and Sweden) are not interested in a full mem-
bership	to	EMU	for	reasons	of	domestic	politics.	It	explains	why	the	UK	but	
also Czech Republic (which was governed by a Eurosceptic majority in 2012) 
were not interested to negotiate the Fiscal Compact. Having an intergovern-
mental	treaty	rather	than	reforming	the	existing	treaties	was	the	mean	for	the	
other member states to bypass the reluctance of Prague and London and to 
get, at the end, a decision (Fabbrini 2013). Regarding implementation, de 
novo institutions also offer some effectiveness to the member states that 
signed	 it.	To	 take	again	 the	example	of	 the	Fiscal Compact, contrary to the 
EU	 treaties	 that	 require	 ratification	 of	 all	 member	 states	 according	 to	 their	
respective constitutional rules, the intergovernmental treaty can enter in force 
when	50	per	cent	of	 the	signing	member	states	have	ratified	 it.	This	deroga-
tion to classic EU law shall be analysed as a guarantee for the member states 
to get effective decisions for the Eurozone.
 The creation of de novo institutions in the EU to manage the economic and 
financial	crisis	demonstrates	that	EU	theories	have	to	avoid	reducing	the	power	
relationships between member states and supranational institutions to a zero sum 
game. As Simon Bulmer wrote in a comment to an early draft of this chapter, 
theory is very often a ‘matter of taste’.8	 Considering	 the	 theoretical	 box,	 new	
intergovernmentalism	seems	 to	be	 the	 tastiest	 tool	 to	explain	 the	effects	of	 the	
economic	and	financial	crisis	on	institutional	change.
Conclusion
This	book	is	about	regional	institutional	change	in	periods	of	economic	and	fin-
ancial	crises.	The	EU	offers	an	excellent	case	study	 to	 reflect	on	 this	phenom-
enon	as	it	has	experienced	between	2009	and	2012	a	lot	of	institutional	changes	
resulting	from	a	difficult	economic	and	financial	crisis.	As	a	conclusion,	I	would	
like to come back on two questions that Saurugger and Terpan invite us to think 
about in this volume.
	 The	first	 is	 the	power	 relations	between	 the	member	states	and	 the	 regional	
organisation in the different policy domains. A clear conclusion of this chapter is 
that member states matter and that the capacity of them to resist or, at the 
opposite,	 to	be	deeply	 affected	by	 the	 economic	and	financial	 crisis	has	direct	
influence	 on	 their	 capacity	 to	 exercise	 power	 in	 the	 regional	 organisation.	
Germany, as a member state not only ‘big’ but also able to adapt its economic 
policies	 to	 the	 crisis	 influenced	 the	 search	 for	 solutions	 at	 the	 EU	 level	 and	
increase, by the way, its empowerment at the regional level. We must think more 
about the causality of what Saurugger and Terpan name institutional density 
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when member states are concerned. Institutional density is not only the degree to 
which institutions created by regional organisations constraint member states, 
but also the degree to which domestic politics of the member states constraint 
regional organisations.
 The second question raised by Saurugger and Terpan is the institutional 
change in the regional integration schemes themselves, both with regard to 
formal	 and	 informal	 institutions.	 The	 economic	 and	 financial	 crisis	 has	 con-
firmed	a	long-	term	trend	in	the	building	of	the	EU	polity,	which	is	a	balancing	
act between supranational and intergovernmental methods of integration. In this 
regard, there is always a risk considering too much the relationship between 
crises and institutional changes in regional organisations as a break. The institu-
tional	response	to	the	economic	and	financial	crisis	in	the	EU	can	only	be	under-
stood if we replace the angular momentum in a long- term perspective. Crisis 
does not bring necessarily radical institutional changes but make more visible 
existing	trends,	as	the	balancing	act	between	the	Supranational	Method	and	the	
Intergovernmental Method.
	 Finally,	 the	 economic	 and	 financial	 crisis	 had	 an	 impact	 on	 the	 theoretical	
debate about regional integration. Regarding the EU, forces EU studies to con-
sider more seriously the EU as a polity and not only a governance or a policy 
regime,	 and	 to	 reassess	 the	 theoretical	 toolbox.	New	 intergovernmentalism,	 as	
developed by Bickerton et al.,	fits	particularly	well	with	the	institutional	changes	
during the crisis. It invites the scholar to escape the theoretical trap consisting in 
searching a theory to validate either the superiority of the Supranational Method 
or the superiority of the Intergovernmental Method. New intergovernmentalism 
(as	a	theory	and	not	a	method)	offers	a	good	perspective	to	reflect	on	the	balan-
cing act between the Supranational Method and the Intergovernmental that char-
acterises the EU polity during the crisis and more generally in the long- term 
perspective.
Notes
1	 I	would	like	to	thank	Simon	Bulmer	(University	of	Sheffield),	Sergio	Fabbrini	(Univer-
sity LUISS Rome) and Sabine Saurugger (Sciences Po Grenoble) for their useful com-
ments on the earlier version of the chapter.
2	 Czech	Republic	finally	signed	the	Fiscal	Compact	in	May	2014	after	a	change	of	gov-
ernment and majority in Prague.
3 According to article 3 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the 
exclusive	 competences	 of	 the	 EU	 concern	 the	 following	 and	 limited	 policy	 issues:	
customs union; the establishing of the competition rules necessary for the functioning 
of the internal market; monetary policy for the member states whose currency is the 
euro;	 the	 conservation	 of	 marine	 biological	 resources	 under	 the	 common	 fisheries	
policy; the common commercial policy.
4 www.marcaespana.es.
5 To read Sikorski’s discourse in Berlin on 28 November 2011, see www.mfa.gov.pl/
resource/33ce6061-ec12-4da1-a145-01e2995c6302:JCR.
6 Pringle Case C- 370–12, European Court of Justice, 27 November 2012.
7 Merkel kritisiert EU Parlament und Kommission, Euractiv, 2 November 2010.
8 Simon Bulmer’s comment, email to the author, 18 May 2015.
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